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Duopolistic platform competition for revenue and
throughput
Mansi Sood∗ Ankur A. Kulkarni† Sharayu Moharir‡
Abstract
We consider two competing platforms operating in a two-sided market and offering identical services
to their customers at potentially different prices. The objective of each platform is to maximize its
throughput or revenue by suitably pricing its services. We assume that customers have a preference or
loyalty to the platforms while the workers freelance for the two platforms. Assuming that the resulting
interaction between the users is such that their aggregate utility is maximized, we show that for each
value of the loyalty, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both the throughput and revenue
competition game and characterize it.
Keywords: Platform Competition, Two-sided Market, Crowdsourcing and Multi-leader-follower games
1 Introduction and related work
The recent past has witnessed the meteoric rise of two-sided marketplaces in domains such as transportation,
e.g. Uber, Lyft and the hotel industry, e.g. Airbnb. Platforms like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb provide a way for
the buyer and seller to exchange information about their requirements and thereby perform a transaction.
In return for this service, the platform charges a commission for each transaction. The rise in the popularity
of these services has led to a growing body to research which focuses on their design and operation [1, 2, 5–
8,12,13,16,17] and quantifying their impact [3]. An important issue that complicates the task of evaluating
the impact of such marketplaces is competition among platforms offering similar services. In many cases,
two-sided marketplaces are duopolies in which two competing platforms provide near-identical services to
users1. Thus their impact cannot be measured by merely comparing ‘before’ and ‘after’ scenarios with one
platform. One must also take into account the influence of competition.
Our specific focus in this paper is on duopolistic price competition between platforms that provide similar
service. We characterize Nash equilibria that emerge from this competition when firms are competing for
throughput and for revenue. In the model we consider, each platform maximizes the revenue it generates
or the volume of transactions it makes, i.e., its throughput. In order to maximize its throughput/revenue,
each platform incentivises the participation of price-sensitive workers and customers by suitably pricing its
services. Pricing in two-sided markets is a double-edged sword: while a low price attracts customers, it deters
workers. Likewise, a high price deters customers and attracts workers (see e.g., [4] where the ‘chicken and egg’
problem is discussed in which a platform must decide which side to incentivise given that each side benefits
from increased participation on the other side). In our model, workers freelance for the two platforms and
a customer requires one worker for service and a worker can serve at most one customer. Consequently, the
number of transactions made via a platform is governed by the user group that sees lower participation at
that platform and does not necessarily depend on the total number of users connected to it. In addition,
workers/customers have the freedom to choose to provide/avail service at any platform based on the price
structure in the market.
∗Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA.
†Systems and Control Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Powai, Mumbai 400076.
‡Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Powai, Mumbai 400076.
1In the USA, Uber, and Lyft, and in India, Ola and Uber are rivals in the on-demand transportation business.
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Therefore, a key challenge here is that the price set by one platform affects the user turnout at the other
platform. It is therefore of interest to understand what kind of equilibrium pricing structure emerges in this
duopoly. We study precisely this question in this paper. We model the resulting price competition as a
non-cooperative game in which two competing platforms price their services in a manner which maximises
their transaction volumes or revenue. The decision variables for the platforms are the prices, which they
choose anticipating the outcome of the resulting optimization by the users. Concretely, the objective of each
platform is to maximize the throughput/revenue that results from a lower level optimization, which in turn
depends on the prices chosen by the platforms.
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Figure 1: Allocation of customers and workers to the platforms.
The prices announced by the platforms determine, via demand and supply curves, the total number of
customers and workers willing to enter the market at those prices. However, if one platform announces a high
price and the other announces a low price, all customers (workers) willing to avail (resp., provide) service at the
high (resp., low) price are also willing to avail (resp., provide) it at the low (resp., high) price. Consequently,
prices and the associated demand/supply curves do not automatically determine the number of customers or
workers joining either platform. To disambiguate this, we assume that the interaction between workers and
customers that results after platforms announce prices leads to an allocation which maximizes the aggregate
utility of users. However, this assumption is not sufficient to ensure uniqueness in the allocation of users to
the two platforms given the prices announced by them. This non-uniqueness poses a significant analytical and
conceptual challenge (see [9,10]) since the platforms set their prices to maximize their throughput/revenue in
anticipation of the allocation of users which in turn determines the observed throughput/revenue at the two
platforms2. To make the analysis tractable, we introduce a mechanism for selecting one solution of the user
allocation problem described above. We achieve this by factoring in the potential asymmetry in the customer
preference for the two platforms. Specifically, each allocation in the set of optimal allocations corresponds
to a unique fraction β of customers who desire to avail service at Platform 1, as illustrated in Figure 1. We
refer to this fixed fraction β as the customer loyalty and allow it to take values in (0, 1). We show that a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the price competition game for throughput and revenue exists for each
value of the loyalty. In Section 3.6, we generalize our analysis to include price dependent loyalty wherein
β is a function of prices to model customer preference for lower prices and characterize pure strategy Nash
equilibria for throughput and revenue games even in the presence of price dependent loyalty.
As mentioned before, in the past decade, the task of pricing in two-sided markets has garnered a lot of
attention across various communities [7, 12, 13, 15, 17]. One model [11] of platform competition consists of
users modeled with their private types, using which ‘quasi demand’ curves for the platforms’ services are
obtained as the probability that a user would like to join a particular platform. This model is more suited
to situations where users make long-term subscriptions to platforms they join. We note that our approach is
distinct from the above since we assume that users join platforms based on their instantaneous preferences
and the market settles at the allocation that maximizes the social welfare of workers and customers. Our
approach models situations where users are concerned with the immediate matching of their requests with
high disutility for not being matched. The present work significantly extends its conference version [14] where
only throughput competition is considered.
2Incidentically, the nonuniqueness is also indicative of why platforms may want to use “advertising”, and other forms of
payoff-irrelevant signaling in order to encourage equilibria that are more beneficial to them.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model and Section 3 explains the allocation of
users to the platforms. Section 4 and Section 5 provide a characterization of the equilibrium of the throughput
and revenue games, respectively. Section 6 presents a discussion on the types of equilibria existing under
different market conditions. We summarize our key contributions in Section 7 and provide detailed proofs in
the Appendix.
2 Problem setting
There are two platforms – Platform 1 and Platform 2 which provide identical services to their users. In order
to maximize its throughput (or revenue), each platform chooses one amongst a low price and a high price and
advertises this price to its customers. We assume that of the total customers who are served, a fixed fraction
(β, 0 < β < 1) get served at Platform 1. In our setting, each customer’s service needs can be satisfied by
one worker and each worker can serve at most one customer at a time. We assume that users respond to the
prices announced by the platform in a manner that maximises their aggregate utility. The platforms then
match customers and workers allocated to them. Corresponding to every payment made by a customer, each
platform retains a fixed fraction (1− γ, 0 < γ < 1) and passes on the remaining amount to the worker who
serves that customer. For analytical tractability, we assume that each platform retains the same fraction (γ)
per payment.
2.1 Supply and demand
We use the following notation to quantify the availability of freelance workers and customers.
1. w(p): Number of workers willing to work at price p.
2. c(p): Number of customers willing to pay price p.
3. pi: Price paid by a customer for service at Platform i,
4. ci: Number of customers joining Platform i,
5. wi: Number of workers joining Platform i,
where i = 1, 2.
In each transaction at Platform i, a customer pays pi to Platform i and a worker receives a share γpi from
the transaction, where i = 1, 2. We make the following assumption on the nature of supply/demand curves
and the prices announced by the platforms.
Assumption 1 (Supply and demand) a
a. Demand c(p) is a strictly decreasing function of price p.
b. Supply w(p) is a strictly increasing function of p.
c. Prices p1 and p2 can take values amongst a high price pH or a low price pL, where pL < pH.
d. There exists a unique market clearing price pbal such that w(γpbal) = c(pbal).
Note that we focus on a setting where the supply/demand are completely determined by how the platforms
price their services and consequently the supply/demand do not depend on the participation from the other
side. Such a situation would persist in service critical applications where the customers’ utility only depends
on whether or not they get served regardless of how many potential workers are available.
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2.2 Platform’s objective
We consider two platform objectives – throughput maximization and revenue maximization. The throughput
of a platform is given by the minimum of the following two quantities – the number of workers and the number
of customers joining it. When Platform 1 plays k and Platform 2 plays `, the throughput Nk`i of Platform
i is min{ci, wi} and the revenue of Platform i is given by (1 − γ)piNk`i , where i ∈ {1, 2} and k, ` ∈ {L,H}.
The platforms price their services in a manner that maximizes their throughput or revenue.
2.3 Users’ objective
We assume that the workers and customers get matched through the platforms in a manner that maximizes
their aggregate utility. In order to characterize the utility of the users, we define the following quantities.
1. bwi(γpi): Benefit of a worker from serving a customer through Platform i,
3. bci(pi): Benefit of a customer getting served by a worker through Platform i,
2. m: Cost of maintenance for a worker per transaction,
4. −dw: Disutility experienced by an unmatched worker,
5. −dc: Disutility experienced by an unmatched customer,
6. ui = ui(pi) := bwi(γpi) + bci(pi) − m − pi, where i = 1, 2.. This is the benefit to the users per
transaction at Platform i when it announces a price pi. This includes the utility of a worker-customer
pair interacting at Platform i, where i = 1, 2.
We make the following assumptions in describing the utility of users.
Assumption 2 (Utility of users) a
a. p1, p2,m, dw, dc > 0.
b. Price pi is such that utility of a worker or a customer joining the platform is positive, i.e., bwi(γpi)−m >
0 and bci(pi)− pi > 0, where i = 1, 2.
In the absence of Assumption 2(b), individual workers and customers would not have any incentive to join
the platform.
3 Allocation of users
Recall that once the two platforms set their prices, users are allocated to the platforms in a manner which
maximizes their aggregate utility subject to the following constraints.
a) The number of workers/customers joining a particular platform cannot exceed the supply/demand level
corresponding to the price set by it.
b) The total number of workers/customers joining either of the platforms can be at most equal to the
supply/demand corresponding to the higher/lower price.
The preceding constraints are insufficient to ensure the uniqueness of aggregate utility-maximizing allocation.
Hence, we additionally impose the following additional constraint. Recall that β denotes the loyalty.
c) If c1 and c2 customers join Platform 1 and Platform 2 respectively, then the ratio c1/c2 = β/(1− β).
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w1,w2,c1,c2
u1 min{c1, w1}+ u2 min{c2, w2}
− dw(w1 −min{c1, w1}+ w2 −min{c2, w2})
− dc(c1 −min{c1, w1}+ c2 −min{c2, w2}) (S)
s.t. 0 ≤ w1 ≤ w(γp1),
0 ≤ w2 ≤ w(γp2),
w1 + w2 ≤ w(max{γp1, γp2}),
0 ≤ c1 ≤ c(p1),
0 ≤ c2 ≤ c(p2),
c1 + c2 ≤ c(min{p1, p2}),
c1 = β(c1 + c2).
In a solution w1, w2, c1, c2 of the above optimization, wi, ci respectively denote the number of workers and
customers that join platform i when prices p1, p2 are announced.
Lemma 1 The optimal solution to problem (S) is achieved at a point
(w∗1 , w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) for which c
∗
1 ≥ w∗1 and c∗2 ≥ w∗2, with equality holding in at least one case.
Proof: Suppose the claim is not true, i.e., either c∗1 < w
∗
1 or c
∗
2 < w
∗
2 or c
∗
1 > w
∗
1 and c
∗
2 > w
∗
2 . We separately
analyse these cases,
1. If c∗1 < w
∗
1 , then note that taking w
′
1 = c
∗
1, the point (w
′
1, w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) is feasible since w
′
1 = c
∗
1 <
w∗1 ≤ w(γp) and w′1 + w∗2 = c∗1 + w∗2 < w∗1 + w∗2 ≤ w(γp). Moreover, the objective value increases by
dw(w
∗
1 − c∗1).
2. For the case c∗2 < w
∗
2 , as above we can get a higher objective value by taking w2 as c
∗
2.
3. Finally, when c∗1 > w
∗
1 and c
∗
2 > w
∗
2 , we can decrease c
∗
1, c
∗
2 proportionately to get a larger objective
value while ensuring feasibility is retained. Suppose, for some x > 0, we have c∗1 = βx, c
∗
2 = (1− β)x.
Now, there exists a small positive ∆ such that c1 = β(x − ∆) > w∗1 , c2 = (1 − β)(x − ∆) > w∗2 is
feasible and admits a higher objective value.
Thus in all the three cases, (w∗1 , w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) is sub-optimal which gives a contradiction and hence Lemma 1
holds true.
We proceed with evaluating the throughput/revenue for various combinations of prices announced by the
platform. Using Lemma 1, the objective can be rewritten as u1w1 + u2w2 − dc(c1 − w1)− dc(c2 − w2). For
the purpose of analysing the equilibrium strategies, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Disutility of customers) We assume that the disutility of an unmatched customer is
such that dc >
β
1−βu1 and dc >
1−β
β u2.
This is motivated by settings in which the requested service is critical and the customer is at a great loss
if left unserved. We work with Assumption 3 for the remainder of our analysis.
Lemma 2 If Assumption 3 holds, then at the social welfare optimal point
(w∗1 , w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) there are no unmatched customers or workers, i.e., w
∗
1 = c
∗
1 and w
∗
2 = c
∗
2.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we can have the following two cases, c∗2 = w
∗
2 , c
∗
1 ≥ w∗1 or c∗1 = w∗1 , c∗2 ≥ w∗2 . We
first analyse the case c∗2 = w
∗
2 , c
∗
1 ≥ w∗1 . The optimization problem becomes,
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max
w1,c1
(u1 + dc)w1 + (
1− β
β
u2 − dc)c1
s.t. 0 ≤ w1 ≤ min{c1, w(γp1)},
w1 +
1− β
β
c1 ≤ w(max{γp1, γp2}),
c1 ≤ min{ β
1− βw(γp2), c(p1),
β
1− β c(p2), βc(min{p1, p2})}.
Suppose w∗1 6= c∗1. From Lemma 1, it follows that w∗1 < c∗1. Now, consider ∆ > 0 such that w∗1 < c∗1−∆ < c∗1.
Note that in the objective function, the coefficient of c1 is negative and taking c1 as c
∗
1−∆ retains feasibility
and admits a higher objective value. This violates the optimality of (w∗1 , w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) and hence w
∗
1 6= c∗1. Next,
we analyse the case c∗1 = w
∗
1 , c
∗
2 ≥ w∗2 . Using Lemma 1 simplifies (S) to the following equivalent optimization
problem.
max
w2,c2
(u2 + dc)w2 + (
β
1− β u1 − dc)c2
s.t. 0 ≤ w2 ≤ min{c2, w(γp2)},
β
1− β c2 + w2 ≤ w(max{γp1, γp2}),
c2 ≤ min{1− β
β
w(γp1), c(p2),
1− β
β
c(p1), (1− β)c(min{p1, p2})}.
Arguing as above, we can show that a point (w∗1 , w
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2) such that w
∗
2 < c
∗
2 is sub-optimal and hence
c∗2 = w
∗
2 .
Theorem 1 (Routing of users) The solution to the social welfare maximization problem (S) is the follow-
ing,
c∗1 = w
∗
1 = min
{
w(γp1),
β
1− βw(γp2), c(p1),
β
1− β c(p2),
βc(min{p1, p2}), βw(max{γp1, γp2})
}
,
c∗2 = w
∗
2 = min
{1− β
β
w(γp1), w(γp2),
1− β
β
c(p1), c(p2),
(1− β)c(min{p1, p2}), (1− β)w(max{γp1, γp2})
}
.
Proof: From Lemma 2, we get the following equivalent optimization problem for (S).
max
c1
(u1 +
1− β
β
u2)c1
s.t. 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{w(γp1), β
1− βw(γp2), c(p1),
β
1− β c(p2),
βc(min{p1, p2}), βw(max{γp1, γp2})}.
Note that in the objective function, the coefficient of c1 is positive and thus the largest feasible c1 is optimal.
The values of c2, w1, w2 are then obtained using Lemma 2. Thus, if Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold,
there is a unique solution to Problem (S). Thus, for the optimal allocation problem in the absence of loyalty
constraint, each of the possible multiple solutions corresponds to a unique loyalty c1/(c1 + c2); hence β can
be interpreted as a mechanism to pick a unique solution from the solution set of this problem.
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4 Equilibrium strategies for throughput competition
In this section, we analyse the non-cooperative game between the platforms as they compete for throughput.
The two platforms can choose to play either a low price pL or a high price pH (these strategies are denoted
L and H). After the prices have been announced, the number of workers and customers joining the two
platforms is given by Theorem 1. This gives the throughput of the two platforms for any pair of strategies
chosen by the platforms. Thus, we get a game in which each platform seeks to maximize its throughput. We
denote the payoff (throughput) of Platform i when Platform 1 plays k and Platform 2 plays ` by Nk`i , where
i ∈ {1, 2} and k, ` ∈ {L,H}. The payoff matrix for the resulting game is given in Table 1. Recall that from
Theorem 1, it follows that the throughput for Platform 2 is same as the throughput of Platform 1 scaled
by factor 1−ββ . From Theorem 1, we obtain the following expression for the throughput of Platform 1 for
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L (NLL1 , N
LL
2 ) (N
LH
1 , N
LH
2 )
H (NHL1 , N
HL
2 ) (N
HH
1 , N
HH
2 )
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the two platforms.
different strategies chosen by the platforms.
NLL1 = min{βc(pL), βw(γpL)}, (1)
NLH1 = min{
β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (2)
NHH1 = min{βc(pH), βw(γpH)}, (3)
NHL1 = min{c(pH), βc(pL),
β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (4)
Next, we characterize the Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this game and ascertain the impact of the
loyalty (β) on the same. Depending on whether the demand and supply match at the prices pH or pL, we
separately analyse the following three cases –
1. pL < pbal < pH.
2. pL < pH ≤ pbal.
3. pbal ≤ pL < pH.
4.1 pL < pbal < pH
In this case, the market is strictly supply limited at pL and strictly demand limited at pH. The succeeding
theorem gives the equilibrium strategies for the platforms. From Assumption 1, we have βw(γpL) ≤ βc(pL)
and βc(pH) ≤ βw(γpH). Therefore, NLL1 = βw(γpL) and NHH1 = βc(pH). We find that the nature of the
Nash equilbrium depends intimately on the ratio,
ρ :=
c(pH)
w(γpL)
. (5)
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium strategies) Let Assumption 1 hold and let pL < pbal < pH.Then the pure
strategy Nash equilibria (NE) for the throughput maximization game between the two competing platforms are
as follows.
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1. (L, L) is a NE iff max{ρ, 0} ≤ β ≤ min{1− ρ, 1}.
2. (L, H) is a NE iff max{1− ρ, 0} ≤ β ≤ min{1
ρ
, 1}.
3. (H, L) is a NE iff max{1− 1
ρ
, 0} ≤ β ≤ min{ρ, 1}.
4. (H, H) is a NE iff max{1
ρ
, 0} ≤ β ≤ min{1− 1
ρ
, 1}.
The proof is in Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates Theorem 2. Observe that depending on the ratio of the lowest possible demand to the
lowest possible supply (c(pH)/w(γpL)) we get the range of values of loyalty (β) for which the various equilibria
occur. Thus, Theorem 2 completely characterizes the Nash equilibrium for this case. It also shows that at
least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for the game and gives the precise conditions for
existence of multiple pure strategy equilibria for the game. When the customer loyalty for the two platforms
is close to 1/2, if the number of customers at the high price is significantly less than the number of workers
at the low price, then (L, L) emerges as the Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the platforms operate at a low
price which might be desirable to the customers. Conversely, if workers at the low price are fewer in number
than the customers at the high price then (H, H) corresponds to the Nash equilibrium.
(L,L) (L,H)(H,L)
0 ⇢ 1  ⇢ 1
(L,H)
(H,L)
1/2
0 ⇢1  ⇢ 11/2
(H,L)
(L,H)
0 11/21  1/⇢ 1/⇢
(H,H) (H,L)(L,H)
0 11/2
 
 
 
 1/⇢ 1  1/⇢
⇢  1/2
1/2  ⇢  1
1  ⇢  2
2  ⇢
Effect	of	loyalty	(β)	on	equilibria⇢ = c(pH)
w( pL)
Figure 2: Dependence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for the throughput maximization game on customer
loyalty β and the ratio ρ i.e., c(pH)/w(γpL).
4.2 pL < pH ≤ pbal
In this case, the market is supply limited at both pL and pH. Observe that
NLL1 = min{βc(pL), βw(γpL)} = βw(γpL), (6)
NHH1 = min{βc(pH), βw(γpH)} = βw(γpH), (7)
NLH1 = min{
β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
= min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (8)
NHL1 = min{c(pH), βc(pL),
β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}
= min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (9)
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From Assumption 1 and 0 < β < 1, it follows that
βw(γpH) ≤ βc(pH) < β
1− β c(pH), (10)
βw(γpH) ≤ βc(pH) < βc(pL), (11)
βw(γpH) < w(γpH) ≤ c(pH). (12)
Here, Equation (8) follows by combining Inequalities (10) and (11). Moreover, combining Inequalities (11)
and (12) gives Equation (9) Table 2 gives the payoff for Platform 1.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L βw(γpL) min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
H min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} βw(γpH)
Table 2: Payoff matrix for Platform 1 if pL < pH ≤ pbal. Platform 1 is the row player, Platform 2 is the
column player. The payoff for Platform 2 is same as the payoff of Platform 1 scaled by factor 1−ββ .
Theorem 3 When pL < pH ≤ pbal, (H, H) is always a Nash equilibrium and (L, L) is never an equilibrium.
Moreover,
1. (L, H) is a NE iff 0 < β ≤ min
{
1,
w(γpL)
w(γpH)
}
.
2. (H, L) is a NE iff max
{
1− w(γpL)
w(γpH)
, 0
}
≤ β < 1.
The proof is in Appendix B.
4.3 pbal ≤ pL < pH
This case occurs when both platform announce prices higher than pbal and witness a demand shortage.
Observe that,
NLL1 = min{βc(pL), βw(γpL)} = βc(pL), (13)
NHH1 = min{βc(pH), βw(γpH)} = βc(pH), . (14)
From Assumption 1 and 0 < β < 1, it follows that
βc(pL) < c(pL) ≤ w(γpL), (15)
βc(pL) ≤ βw(γpL) < βw(γpH), (16)
βc(pL) ≤ βw(γpL) < β
1− βw(γpL). (17)
Thus, NLH1 and N
HL
1 can be rewritten as
NLH1 = min{
β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
= min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)}, (18)
NHL1 = min{c(pH), βc(pL),
β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}
= min{c(pH), βc(pL)}. (19)
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The payoff matrix for Platform 1 is given by Table 3.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L βc(pL) min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)}
H min{c(pH), βc(pL)} βc(pH)
Table 3: Payoff matrix for Platform 1 if pbal ≤ pL < pH. The payoff for Platform 2 is same as the payoff of
Platform 1 scaled by factor 1−ββ .
Theorem 4 When pbal ≤ pL < pH, (L, L) is always a Nash equilibrium and (H, H) is never an equilibrium.
Moreover,
1. (L, H) is a NE iff max{1− c(pH)
c(pL)
, 0} ≤ β < 1.
2. (H, L) is a NE iff 0 < β ≤ min{1, c(pH)
c(pL)
}.
The proof is in Appendix C.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) respectively illustrate Theorems 4 and 3. When pL = pbal, the payoffs for the
case when pbal ≤ pL < pH become a limiting case for the payoffs for the pL < pbal < pH case. Likewise,
when pbal = pH, the payoffs for pL < pH ≤ pbal can be viewed as a limiting case of pL < pbal < pH. An
interesting consequence of this theorem is the creation of new pure strategy equilibria. This can be visualised
by comparing Figures 2 and 3.
1
⇢ =
c(pH)
c(pL)
⇢ =
w(pH)
w(pL)
Figure 3: Dependence of Nash equilibria for the throughput maximization game on customer loyalty β for
(a) pbal ≤ pL < pH and (b) pL < pH ≤ pbal.
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5 Equilibrium strategies for revenue competition
In this section, we analyse the revenue competition game between the two platforms. Recall that in each
transaction at Platform i, a customer pays an amount pi and the platform retains a fraction (1− γ)pi. Thus
the revenue of Platform i when Platform 1 plays k and Platform 2 plays ` is given by (1 − γ)piNk`i , where
i ∈ {1, 2} and k, ` ∈ {L,H}. It is important to note that the revenue not only depends on the throughput but
also the price per transaction. A high (resp., low) price fetches more workers (resp., customers) but deters
customers (resp., workers). We observe that in addition to ρ, i.e., the fraction c(pH)/w(γpL), the revenue
intimately depends on the fractions defined below.
f :=
pL
pH
, (20)
ρw :=
w(γpL)
w(γpH)
, (21)
ρc :=
c(pH)
c(pL)
. (22)
Using Assumption 1, we have 0 < f, ρw, ρc < 1 and 0 < ρ.
Remark 5 If (H, H) is a N.E. for the throughput competition game, then it must be a N.E. for the revenue
competition game. Conversely, if (L, L) is a N.E. for the revenue competition game, then it must be a N.E.
for the throughput competition game. Moreover, if H is a dominant strategy for the throughput game, then
H is a dominant strategy for the revenue game. If L is a dominant strategy for the revenue game then L is
also a dominant strategy for the throughput game.
If (H, H) is a N.E. for the throughput competition game, then Platform 1 does not have an incentive to
deviate and thus, NHH1 ≥ NLH1 which implies pHNHH1 ≥ pLNLH1 . Likewise, pHNHH2 ≥ pLNHL2 and thus in
this case, (H, H) is also a N.E. for the revenue competition game. Along similar lines, it can be argued
that if (L, L) is a N.E. for the revenue competition game, then it is also an equilibrium for the throughput
competition game. If (L, L) is a N.E. for the revenue game then for i = 1, 2, pLN
LL
i ≥ pHNHLi which gives
NLLi ≥ pH/pLNHLi > NHLi .
In order to determine the equilibrium strategies for the revenue competition, we separately analyse the
following three cases depending on the ordering of pH and pL with respect to pbal.
1. pL < pH ≤ pbal,
2. pbal ≤ pL < pH,
3. pL < pbal < pH.
For the remainder of this section, we refer to the revenue generated by a platform as the platform’s payoff.
5.1 pL < pH ≤ pbal
This case corresponds to a supply limited market in which both platforms announce prices lower than the
market clearing price pbal. The entries of the payoff matrix for revenue for Platform i can be obtained by
multiplying the entries of the payoff matrix for the throughput game in Table 2 with a fraction (1 − γ) of
the price that Platform i charges to the customers, where i = 1, 2. For instance, if Platform 1 and Platform
2 respectively announce prices pL and pH, then the throughput at Platform 1 is min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}.
Since, each platform retains a fraction (1 − γ) of the price paid by the customer and passes on the rest to
the worker, the revenue for Platform 1 is (1 − γ)pL min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}. Recall that from Theorem 1,
the throughput at Platform 2 is 1−ββ times the throughput at Platform 1. Therefore when Platform 1 and
Platform 2 play (L, H), then the throughput of Platform 2 is 1−ββ min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)} and the revenue
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at Platform 2 is (1−β)(1−γ)pHβ min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}. The resulting payoff matrix for Platform 1 (resp.,
Platform 2) is given respectively by Table 4 (resp., Table 5). For the purpose of equilibrium analysis, all
the entries in Table 4 (resp., Table 5) corresponds to the revenue of Platform 1 (resp., Platform 2) scaled by
a factor 11−γ (resp.,
(1−β)(1−γ)
β ). Since
1
1−γ > 0 (resp.,
(1−β)(1−γ)
β ), the equilibria are unaltered under this
monotonic transformation and these factors have been dropped for simplifying the payoffs without altering
the equilibrium strategies.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβw(γpL) pL min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
H pH min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} pHβw(γpH)
Table 4: Payoff matrix for Platform 1 for the case pL < pH ≤ pbal scaled by a factor 11−γ .
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβw(γpL) pH min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
H pL min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} pHβw(γpH)
Table 5: Payoff matrix for Platform 2 for the case pbal ≤ pL < pH scaled by a factor β(1−γ)(1−β) .
For a platform operating in a supply limited market, announcing a higher price to workers will increase
throughput while fetching more revenue per transaction. From Remark 5 and Theorem 3, we expect (H, H)
to be a N.E. for this case. It turns out that (H, H) is the only N.E. for this case.
Theorem 6 When pL < pH ≤ pbal, (H, H) is the unique Nash equilibrium for the revenue competition game
(see Table 6).
L H
L Never Never
H Never Always
Table 6: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue game when pL < pH ≤ pbal. Platform 1 is the row
player and Platform 2 is the column player.
Proof is in Appendix D.
5.2 pbal ≤ pL < pH
This case corresponds to a high price regime in which the market is demand limited. As before, the revenue of
each platform is obtained by scaling the throughput given in Table 3 by the price announced by the platform
and a factor 1(1−γ) (resp.,
(1−β)(1−γ)
β ) for Platform 1 (resp., Platform 2). The payoff matrix for Platform 1 is
given by Table 7 and that of Platform 2 is given by Table 8. Recall that ρc and f respectively denote
c(pH)
c(pL)
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and pLpH . Observe that
ρc
f corresponds to the ratio of revenue at high price to that at low price in the presence
of a single platform in the market.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβc(pL) pL min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)}
H pH min{c(pH), βc(pL)} pHβc(pH)
Table 7: Payoff matrix for Platform 1 for the case pbal ≤ pL < pH scaled by a factor 1
1− γ .
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβc(pL) pH min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)}
H pL min{c(pH), βc(pL)} pHβc(pH)
Table 8: Payoff matrix for Platform 2 for the case pbal ≤ pL < pH scaled by a factor β
(1− γ)(1− β) .
We now write the conditions under which different equilibria arise for the revenue competition game.
(i) (H, H) is a N.E. iff
pHβc(pH) ≥ pL min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)}, (23)
pHβc(pH) ≥ pL min{c(pH), βc(pL)} (24)
Substituting, β, ρc and f ,
βρc ≥ f min{ β
1− β ρc, β}, (25)
βρc ≥ f min{ρc, β} (26)
Dividing by βρc, we get that (H, H) is a N.E. iff
1
f
≥ min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
}, (27)
1
f
≥ min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
} (28)
(ii) (L, L) is a N.E. iff
pLβc(pL) ≥ pH min{c(pH), βc(pL)}, (29)
pLβc(pL) ≥ pH min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)} (30)
Substituting ρc, β and f ,
fβ ≥ min{ρc, β}, (31)
fβ ≥ min{ β
1− β ρc, β} (32)
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Dividing by β, we see that (L, L) is a N.E. iff
f ≥ min{ρc
β
, 1}, (33)
f ≥ min{ ρc
1− β , 1} (34)
(iii) (L, H) is a N.E. iff
pL min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)} ≥ pHβc(pH), (35)
pH min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL)} ≥ pLβc(pL). (36)
Substituting ρc, β, f ,
f min{ β
1− β ρc, β} ≥ βρc, (37)
min{ β
1− β ρc, β} ≥ fβ. (38)
Rewriting the above inequalities after multiplying (37) (resp., (38)) with a factor
1
fβρc
(resp.,
1
β
),
min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
} ≥ 1
f
, (39)
min{ ρc
1− β , 1} ≥ f. (40)
(iv) Since the two platforms only differ in their respective customer loyalties, the conditions under which (H,
L) is a N.E. can be obtained from the conditions for (L, H) to be a N.E. by replacing the factor 1− β with
β in equations (39) and (40). Consequently, (H, L) is a N.E. iff
min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
} ≥ 1
f
, (41)
min{ρc
β
, 1} ≥ f. (42)
Table 9 summarizes the conditions for the existence of N.E. for pbal ≤ pL < pH where f lies in (0, 1).
Here, the entry under row k and column ` gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of N.E.
for the revenue competition game at (k, `).
L H
L f ≥ min{ρc
β
, 1},min{ ρc
1− β , 1}
1
f
≤ min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
}, f ≤ min{ ρc
1− β , 1}
H
1
f
≤ min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
}, f ≤ min{ρc
β
, 1} 1
f
≥ min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
},min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
}
Table 9: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH. Platform 1
is the row player and Platform 2 is the column player. Here, the entry under row k and column ` gives the
necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of N.E. at (k, `).
Next, we show at least one of the above conditions (as listed in Table 9) hold for any value of β.
Theorem 7 A pure strategy N.E. always exists for the case pbal ≤ pL < pH.
The proof is in Appendix E.
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5.3 pL < pbal < pH
In this case the market is supply limited at the low price and demand limited at the high price. As done
previously for the demand limited and supply limited cases, we can obtain the payoffs for the revenue game,
using the throughput of the platforms from equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). The resulting payoff matrix for
Platform 1 is given by Table 10 and that of Platform 2 is given by Table 11.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβw(γpL)
pL min{ β1−β c(pH), βc(pL),
w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
H
pH min{c(pH), βc(pL),
β
1−βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} pHβc(pH)
Table 10: Payoff matrix for Platform 1 for the case pL < pbal < pH scaled by a factor
1
1−γ . Platform 1 is the
row player and Platform 2 is the column player.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L pLβw(γpL)
pH min{ β1−β c(pH), βc(pL),
w(γpL), βw(γpH)}
H
pL min{c(pH), βc(pL),
β
1−βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} pHβc(pH)
Table 11: Payoff matrix for Platform 2 for the case pL < pbal < pH scaled by a factor
β
(1−γ)(1−β) . Platform 1
is the row player and Platform 2 is the column player.
(i) (L, L) is a N.E. iff
pLβw(γpL) ≥ pH min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (43)
pLβw(γpL) ≥ pH min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (44)
Dividing by β and substituting f ,
fw(γpL) ≥ min{c(pH)
β
, c(pL),
w(γpL)
1− β ,w(γpH)}, (45)
fw(γpL) ≥ min{c(pH)
1− β , c(pL),
w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)}. (46)
Using Assumption 1 and 0 < β < 1, we have
w(γpL) < min{c(pL), w(γpH), w(γpL)
1− β ,
w(γpL)
β
} (47)
and therefore (45) and (46) hold iff
w(γpL)f ≥ c(pH)
β
, (48)
w(γpL)f ≥ c(pH)
1− β . (49)
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Therefore substituting ρ above, we get that (L, L) is a N.E. iff
f ≥ ρ
β
, (50)
f ≥ ρ
1− β . (51)
(ii) (H, H) is a N.E. iff
pHβc(pH) ≥ pL min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (52)
pHβc(pH) ≥ pL min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (53)
Dividing by β and substituting f ,
1
f
c(pH) ≥ min{c(pH)
β
, c(pL),
w(γpL)
1− β ,w(γpH)}, (54)
1
f
c(pH) ≥ min{c(pH)
1− β , c(pL),
w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)}. (55)
From Assumption 1, observe that
1
ρρw
=
w(γpH)
c(pH)
> 1,
ρ
ρc
=
c(pL)
w(γpL)
> 1. (56)
Now, substituting ρ, ρc, ρw,
1
f
≥ min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
,
1
ρ(1− β) ,
1
ρρw
}, (57)
1
f
≥ min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
,
1
ρ(β)
,
1
ρρw
}. (58)
(iii) (L, H) is a N.E. iff
pL min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ pHβc(pH), (59)
pH min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ pLβw(γpL). (60)
Dividing by β and substituting f ,
min{c(pH)
1− β , c(pL),
w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)} ≥ 1
f
c(pH), (61)
min{c(pH)
1− β , c(pL),
w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)} ≥ fw(γpL). (62)
Note that in (62), w(γpL) < min{c(pL), w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)}. Now, for (62) to hold true, fw(γpL) ≤ c(pH)
1− β .
Thus, (L, H) is a N.E. iff
min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
,
1
ρβ
,
1
ρρw
} ≥ 1
f
, (63)
ρ
1− β ≥ f. (64)
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(iv) As in the previous case, the conditions under which (H, L) is a N.E. can be obtained from the conditions
for (L, H) to be a N.E. by replacing the factor 1− β with β. Thus, (H, L) is a N.E. iff
min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
,
1
ρ(1− β) ,
1
ρρw
} ≥ 1
f
, (65)
ρ
β
≥ f. (66)
Table 12 summarizes the conditions for the existence of various pure strategy N.E for this case.
L H
L f ≥ ρ1−β , ρβ
1
f ≤ min{ 11−β , 1ρc , 1ρβ , 1ρρw },
f ≤ ρ1−β
H
1
f ≤ min{ 1β , 1ρc , 1ρ(1−β) , 1ρρw },
f ≤ ρβ
1
f ≥ min{ 11−β , 1ρc , 1ρβ , 1ρρw },
1
f ≥ min{ 1β , 1ρc , 1ρ(1−β) , 1ρρw }
Table 12: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue game when pL < pbal < pH. Here, ρ =
c(pH)
w(γpL)
, ρw =
w(γpL)
w(γpH)
, ρc =
c(pH)
c(pL)
. Platform 1 is the row player and Platform 2 is the column player.
Theorem 8 A pure strategy N.E. always exists for the case pL < pbal < pH.
Proof is in Appendix F.
6 Discussion
We now present a discussion on the results obtained for the throughput and revenue competition games under
different market conditions and loyalty functions.
6.1 Supply limited market
1. For throughput game,
(a) Both platforms together achieve their best throughput at (H, H) (Table 13). Playing high price is
a weakly dominant strategy for the platforms and thus (H, H) is always a N.E.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L w(γpL) min{w(γpL)
β
,w(γpH)}
H min{w(γpL)
1− β ,w(γpH)} w(γpH)
Table 13: Total number of workers served for supply limited market (pL < pH ≤ pbal) for fixed β.
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(b) In a market which is supply limited at (p1, p2), the following three constraints on w1 need to be
met –
w1 ≤ w(γp1), (67)
w1 ≤ β
1− βw(γp2), (68)
w1 ≤ βw(max{γp1, γp2}). (69)
(67) corresponds to the supply constraint at Platform 1 w1 ≤ w(γp1). Recall that w∗2 =
1− β
β
w∗1
and thus (67) corresponds to the supply constraint at Platform 2. (69) captures the upper-bound
on the total supply available in the market.
(c) (L, H) is a N.E. iff w(γpH) ≤ w(γpL)/β. This occurs when (69) provides a tighter upper bound than
(67), i.e., the total number of workers served is w(γpH). Platform 2 is strictly better off playing
H than L. Platform 1 is indifferent to either of the two strategies when βw(γpH) ≤ w(γpL). If
there’s a perturbation in the market which results in βw(γpH) exceeding w(γpL) then Platform 1
is no longer indifferent and strictly prefers H over L. (H, L) is a N.E. iff w(γpH) ≤ w(γpL)/(1−β).
If w(γpH) is significantly greater than w(γpL), then (H, H) is the only equilibrium.
(d) When β = 1/2,
i. (L, H) and (H, L) are N.E. iff w(γpL) ≤ w(γpH) ≤ 2w(γpL).
ii. If there was only a single throughput maximizing platform in the market, it would have played
the high price, paying an amount γpH to each of the w(γpH) workers availing service.
In contrast, (L, H) and (H, L) may also be equilibria in the case of two platforms. When, (L,
H) is an equilibrium then of the total w(γpH) workers availing service, βw(γpH) get served at
Platform 1 receiving an amount γpL while the rest get served at Platform 2 at γpH. Observe
that in the case of a single as well as two platforms, a total of w(γpH) workers get served but
a fraction βw(γpH) receive a lower payment in the case of two platforms. Consequently, the
aggregate utility of workers can be lower when two identical platforms operate in a supply
limited market.
(e) When β < 1/2, Platform 1 has lower customer loyalty than Platform 2.
i. If (H, L) is a N.E. then (L, H) is also a N.E but the converse is not true. This follows from
noting that in the payoff matrix
β
1− βw(γpL) < w(γpL) when β < 1/2.
2. For the revenue competition game,
(a) Playing high price is a strictly dominant strategy for both platforms and thus (H, H) is always a
N.E. Moreover, (H, H) is the only N.E. for the revenue game.
6.2 Demand limited market
1. For the throughput competition game,
(a) L is a dominant strategy for both Platforms. The Platforms achieve their highest throughput at
(L, L) and it is always a N.E.
(b) (L, H) is an equilibrium iff c(pL) ≤ c(pH)
1− β and (H, L) is an equilibrium ff c(pL) ≤
c(pH)
β
.
The remaining analysis for throughput game in a demand limited setting is analogous to the supply
limited market with strategies H and L interchanged.
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2. For the revenue competition game,
(a) Let RH/RL denote the ratio pHc(pH)/pLc(pL). Table 14 enlists the conditions for existence of N.E
(Table 9 ) in terms of RH/RL and pL/pH.
(b) Note that (H, H) is never an equilibrium for the throughput game. However, observe that is
RH/RL ≥ 1, then (H, H) is a N.E. At (H, H) Platform 1 generates (1− γ)βpHc(pH) and Platform
2 generates (1− γ)(1− β)pHc(pH).
(c) If c(pL) ≤ c(pH)/1− β, c(pH)/β, then (L, L) ceases to be an equilibrium.
L H
L RH/RL ≤ β, 1− β pH/pL ≤ 1/1− β, 1− β ≤ RH/RL ≤ 1
H pH/pL ≤ 1/β, β ≤ RH/RL ≤ 1 RH/RL ≥ 1 or pH/pL ≥ 1/1− β, 1/β
Table 14: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH in terms of
RH/RL and pL/pH.
6.3 Market with price dependent customer loyalty
Here, we analyse the more general case where β is allowed to be a function of (p1, p2) such that a larger
fraction of customers avails service at the cheaper platform when the platforms price their services differently.
Specifically,
β(p1, p2) =

1/2 if p1 = p2,
1/2 + t if p1 < p2, where 0 < t < 1/2,
1/2− t if p1 > p2.
(70)
Lemma 3 Consider the two-player simultaneous move game with symmetric payoffs given by Table (15). A
pure strategy N.E. always exists for this game.
Proof: We prove this by finding at least one N.E. for all the cases below,
1. If a11 ≥ a21 then (L, L) is a N.E.
2. If a22 ≥ a12 then (H, H) is a N.E.
3. If a11 < a21 and a22 < a12 then both (L, H) and (H, L) are equilibria.
Thus, we have argued for the existence of N.E. for all values of payoffs and this completes the proof.
B1 B2
A1 (a11, a11) (a12, a21)
A2 (a21, a21) (a22, a22)
Table 15: Payoffs for a two player simultaneous move game. Here, a11 denotes Platform 1’s payoff when
Platform1 plays A1 and Platform 2 plays B1.
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Theorem 9 In the presence of price dependent customer loyalty, let t ∈ [0, 1/2] and
β(p1, p2) =

1/2 if p1 = p2,
1/2 + t if p1 < p2,
1/2− t if p1 > p2,
(71)
a pure strategy N.E. always exists for the throughput and revenue competition games.
Proof: From the perspectives of users, all that the platforms differ in is the prices they charge and since
the prices announced completely determines the loyalty, the observed throughputs for the platforms should
be symmetric with respect to the prices charged by them, i.e., Nk`1 = N
`k
2 , where k, ` ∈ L,H. Further, since
both the platforms only have the prices pL, pH as available strategies, the revenue generated by them is also
symmetric with respect to prices. It follows that the payoff of Platform 1 at (L, H) is same as the payoff
of Platform 2 at (H, L) and vice versa. Also, when both platforms announce same prices, their payoffs are
identical. Thus, the game is of the form described in Table 15 and using Lemma 3, it follows that a pure
strategy N.E. always exists.
Recall that the solution to the user allocation problem (S) was computed at a fixed price. Using Theorem 1,
we analyse the supply and demand limited markets in the presence of price dependent loyalty.
1. If β is a function (p1, p2) as defined above, the throughput for the supply limited market is given in
Tables 16, 17 and 18. (H, H) is a N.E. if w(γpH)/2 ≥ w(γpL). Unlike the case of fixed loyalty β, when
Platform 2 is playing H, Platform 1 can achieve better throughput by playing L if w(γpH)/2 < w(γpL).
Also note that for Platform 1, (L, H) yields a better throughput than (H, L). This is because the total
number of workers who are served is min{w(γpL)
1/2 + t
, w(γpH)} for both (L, H) and (H, L) but Platform
1’s share is larger when it plays the lower price.
L H
L w(γpL)/2 min{w(γpL), (1/2 + t)w(γpH)}
H min{1/2− t
1/2 + t
w(γpL), (1/2− t)w(γpH)} w(γpH)/2
Table 16: Throughput for Platform 1 for supply limited market (pL < pH ≤ pbal) with β as a function of
(p1, p2). Platform 1 is the row player, Platform 2 is the column player.
L H
L w(γpL)/2 min{1/2− t
1/2 + t
w(γpL), (1/2− t)w(γpH)}
H min{w(γpL), (1/2 + t)w(γpH)} w(γpH)/2
Table 17: Throughput for Platform 2 for supply limited market (pL < pH ≤ pbal) with β as a function of
(p1, p2). Platform 1 is the row player, Platform 2 is the column player.
2. If β is allowed to be a function of (p1, p2) as defined in (70), then for the demand-limited market, (L,
L) is always the unique N.E. for throughput game. The throughput of Platform 1 is given in Table 19.
Observe that NHL1 = min{c(pH), (1/2 − t)c(pL)} ≤ (1/2 − t)c(pL) < 1/2)c(pL) = NHL1 . Moreover,
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Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L w(γpL) min{w(γpL)
1/2 + t
, w(γpH)}
H min{w(γpL)
1/2 + t
, w(γpH)} w(γpH)
Table 18: Total number of workers served when pL < pH ≤ pbal and β is a function of price (p1, p2).
c(pH)/2 < c(pL)/2 < (1/2 + t)c(pL)/2 and c(pH)/2 < c(pH) <
1/2 + t
1/2− t c(pH) and thus N
HH
1 ≤ NLH1 .
Therefore, L emerges as a strictly dominant strategy for the platforms in this case.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L c(pL)/2 min{1/2 + t
1/2− t c(pH), (1/2 + t)c(pL)}
H min{c(pH), (1/2− t)c(pL)} c(pH)/2
Table 19: Throughput for Platform 1 for demand limited market (pbal ≤ pL < pH) with β as a function of
(p1, p2).
We now analyse the case where all the customers go to the platform with the lower price. This is essentially
a market in the absence of loyalty where customers simply affiliate with the platform which charges them
less. More precisely, β is described as follows,
β(p1, p2) =

1/2 if p1 = p2,
1 if p1 < p2,
0 if p1 > p2.
(72)
Observe that the customers choose the platform with the lower price independent of all other characteristics
of the platforms and therefore therefore it can be argued that (L,H) is an equilibrium iff (H,L) is an
equilibrium.
1. For the supply limited market (Table 20),
(a) For throughput game, (L, L) is always a N.E. and (H, H) is a N.E. iff w(γpH) ≥ 2w(γpL) and (L,
H), (H, L) are never equilibria. .
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L w(γpL)/2 w(γpL)
H 0 w(γpH)/2
Table 20: Throughput for Platform 1 for supply limited market (pL < pH ≤ pbal) with β as described in (72).
(b) For revenue game, (L, L) is always a N.E. and (H, H) is a N.E. iff pHw(γpH) ≥ 2pLw(γpL) and
(L, H), (H, L) are never equilibria.
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2. For the demand limited market (Table 21),
(a) For throughput game, (L, L) is the only equilibrium and it always exists.
(b) For revenue game, (L, L) is always a N.E. and (H, H) is a N.E. iff pHc(pH) ≥ 2pLc(pL) and (L, H),
(H, L) are never equilibria.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L c(pL)/2 c(pL)
H 0 c(pH)/2
Table 21: Throughput for Platform 1 for demand limited market (pbal ≤ pL < pH) with β as described in
(72).
3. When pL < pbal < pH (Table 22),
(a) For throughput game, (L, L) is always a N.E. and (H, H) is a N.E. iff c(pH) ≥ 2w(γpL)
(b) For revenue game, (L, L) is always a N.E. and (H, H) is a N.E. iff pHc(pH) ≥ 2pLw(γpL) and (L,
H), (H, L) are never equilibria.
Platform 2
L H
Platform 1
L w(γpL)/2 w(γpL)
H 0 c(pH)/2
Table 22: Throughput for Platform 1 for market with pL < pbal < pH and β as described in (72).
Thus, in the presence of strictly price dependent loyalties as described by (72), the platforms are forced
to play indentical prices at equilibrium.
7 Summary
We modelled duopolistic platform competition in two-sided markets in which two platforms provide identical
services to the users at potentially different prices. We characterized the Nash equilibrium strategies of a
price competition game for throughput and revenue between two platforms operating in this setting. We
assumed that customers have a preference or loyalty to the platforms, and the resulting allocation maximized
the aggregate utility of the users. We found that for each value of the loyalty, there exists a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and characterized it. We also established the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the case of
price dependent loyalty constraints in which more customers avail service at the platform which announces
the lower price. Further questions to be explored include the consideration of allocations based on individual
utility maximization, asymmetric commissions and loss of efficiency due to the presence of intermediaries.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: We separately find necessary and sufficient conditions for all four cases.
(i) (L, L) is an equilibrium iff the following hold,
βw(γpL) ≥ min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (73)
βw(γpL) ≥ min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (74)
Here, (73) ensures that Platform 2 does not have an incentive to deviate and likewise (74) ensures that
Platform 1 also does not deviate unilaterally. Note that the following inequalities hold,
βw(γpL) < βc(pL), (75)
βw(γpL) < w(γpL), (76)
βw(γpL) < βw(γpH), (77)
βw(γpL) <
β
1− βw(γpL). (78)
Observe that (75), (77) follow from Assumption 1 and (76), (78) are a trivial consequence of loyalty
(β) lying in (0, 1). Using (75), (76), (77), it follows that condition (73) holds iff
β
1− β c(pH) ≤ βw(γpL).
Similarly from (75), (77), (78) it follows that (74) holds iff c(pH) ≤ βw(γpL). Thus, (L, L) is an equilibrium
iff
β
1− β c(pH) ≤ βw(γpL) and c(pH) ≤ βw(γpL) where β ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) (L, H) is an equilibrium iff the following hold,
min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ βc(pH), (79)
min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ βw(γpL). (80)
Assumption 1 and 0 < β < 1 also give the following,
βc(pH) <
β
1− β c(pH), (81)
βc(pH) < βc(pL), (82)
βc(pH) < βw(γpH). (83)
It is easy to see that βc(pH) ≤ w(γpL) together with (81), (82), (83) is necessary and sufficient for (79)
to hold. Similarly, (76), (77), (75) and βw(γpL) ≤ β
1− β c(pH) ensures that (80) holds. Thus, (L, H) is a NE
iff βc(pH) ≤ w(γpL) and βw(γpL) ≤ β
1− β c(pH).
(iii) (H, L) is an equilibrium iff the following hold,
min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ βw(γpL), (84)
min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ βc(pH). (85)
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The proof for this case is analogous to Case (ii).
(iv) (H, H) is an equilibrium iff the following hold,
βc(pH) ≥ min{ β
1− β c(pH), βc(pL), w(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (86)
βc(pH) ≥ min{c(pH), βc(pL), β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (87)
Observe that (81), (82), (83) along with w(γpL) ≤ βc(pH) is necessary and sufficient for (86) to hold. We
have βc(pH) < c(pH). Combining this with (82), (83),
β
1− βw(γpL) ≤ βc(pH) is a necessary and sufficient
for (87) to hold. Hence, we get a NE at (H, H) iff w(γpL) ≤ βc(pH) and β
1− βw(γpL) ≤ βc(pH).
B Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 4 Consider a general two-player simultaneous move game in two strategies S1, S2 available to each
player and payoffs given by Table (23) such that 0 < β < 1 and a1 ≤ a2. There always exists a pure strategy
N.E. for this game.Further,
(i) (S1, S1) can never be a N.E.
(ii) (S2, S2) is always a N.E.
(iii) (S1, S2) s a N.E. iff 0 < β ≤ min{1, a1a2 }.
(iv) (S2, S1) is a N.E. iff 1− a1a2 ≤ β.
S1 S2
S1 βa1 min{a1, βa2}
S2 min{ β1−βa1, βa2} βa2
Table 23: Payoffs for a two player simultaneous move game with 0 < β < 1 and a1 ≤ a2.
Proof:[of Lemma 4]
(i) (S1, S1) is a N.E. iff βa1 ≥ min{a1, βa2} and βa1 ≥ min{ β1−βa1, βa2}. However, with 0 < β < 1 we
have
βa1 < a1, (88)
βa1 < βa2, (89)
βa1 <
β
1− β a2. (90)
From Inequalities (88), (88) and (90) it follows that (S1, S1) can never be a N.E.
(ii) (S2, S2) is a N.E. iff βa2 ≥ min{a1, βa2} and βa2 ≥ min{ β1−βa1, βa2}. Observe that given any a, b ∈ R,
the inequality a ≥ min{a, b} holds by definition and consequently (S2, S2) is always a N.E..
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(iii) (S1, S2) is a N.E. iff
min{a1, βa2} ≥ βa1, (91)
min{a1, βa2} ≥ βa2. (92)
Inequality (91) directly follows when 0 < β < 1. Note that (92) holds iff βa2 ≤ a1. Thus, (S1, S2) is a
Nash Equilibrium iff 0 < β ≤ min{1, a1a2 }.
(iv) (S2, S1) is a N.E. iff
min{ β
1− β a1, βa2} ≥ βa1, (93)
min{ β
1− β a1, βa2} ≥ βa2. (94)
As above, using 0 < β < 1, (93) always hold. However, (94) is true iff βa2 ≤ β
1− β a1 or equivalently
β ≥ 1− a1a2 with β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: [of Theorem 3] Theorem 3 is a consequence of Lemma 4 with S1 = L, S2 = H, a1 = w(γpL) and
a2 = w(γpH) and noting that from Assumption 1, w(γpL) ≤ w(γpH).
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 4 with S1 = H, S2 = L, a1 = c(pH), a2 = c(pL) and by replacing β
by 1−β. Further, upon multiplying the payoff matrix with a factor β1−β and observing that from Assumption
1, c(pH) ≤ c(pL), Theorem 4 emerges as a consequence of Lemma 4.
D Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: (i) (H, H) is a N.E. iff
pHβw(γpH) ≥ pL min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (95)
pHβw(γpH) ≥ pL min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (96)
Substituting ρw =
w(γpL)
w(γpH)
and f =
pL
pH
, the above inequalities can be rewritten as,
β ≥ f min{ρw, β}, (97)
β ≥ f min{ β
1− β ρw, β}. (98)
For a, b, k ∈ R+, we have min{ka, kb} = kmin{a, b} and thus we can divide both sides of (97) and (98) by β,
to get,
1 ≥ f min{ρw
β
, 1}, , (99)
1 ≥ f min{ ρw
1− β , 1}. (100)
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Noting that min{ρw
β
, 1} ≤ 1 and combining this with 0 < f < 1, we see that (99) always holds for this case.
A similar argument suffices to establish the truth of (99). Thus, (H, H) is a N.E. (ii) (L, L) is a N.E. iff
pLβw(γpL) ≥ pH min{ β
1− βw(γpL), βw(γpH)}, (101)
pLβw(γpL) ≥ pH min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)}. (102)
The above inequalities can be expressed in terms of ρw, β and f as,
fβρw ≥ min{ β
1− β ρw, β}, (103)
fβρw ≥ min{ρw, β}. (104)
Dividing both sides by βρw, we get,
f ≥ min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρw
}, (105)
f ≥ min{ 1
β
,
1
ρw
}. (106)
Recall that 0 < f, ρw, β < 1 and thus
1
1− β ,
1
β
,
1
ρw
> 1. Therefore, (105) and (106) do not hold and (L, L)
is not a N.E. for this case. (iii) (L, H) is a N.E. iff
pL min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ pHβw(γpH), (107)
pH min{w(γpL), βw(γpH)} ≥ pLβw(γpL). (108)
Substituting ρw, β and f we get,
f min{ρw, β} ≥ β, (109)
min{ρw, β} ≥ fβρw. (110)
Dividing by β,
f min{ρw
β
, 1} ≥ 1, (111)
min{ 1
ρw
,
1
β
} ≥ f. (112)
If (111) is true, then f ≥ f min{ρw
β
, 1} ≥ 1 which contradicts the fact that 0 < f < 1. (iv) (H, L) is a N.E.
iff
f min{ ρw
1− β , 1} ≥ 1, (113)
min{ 1
ρw
,
1
1− β } ≥ f. (114)
As above, (113) does not hold and thus neither (L,H) nor (H, L) are equilibria.
E Proof of Theorem 7
Proof: We now analyse the conditions in Table 9 in more detail by separately solving the three cases –
β < 1/2, β = 1/2 and β > 1/2.
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1. β <
1
2
(a) ρc ≤ β
Table 24 gives the conditions for the existence of various pure strategy equilibria. We now sepa-
rately analyse the two cases,
i. f ≥ ρc
β
: (L, L) is a N.E.
ii. When f <
ρc
β
, further consider the two cases,
A. f < β: (H, H) is a N.E.
B. f ≥ β: (H, L) is a N.E. since β ≤ f < ρc
β
.
Thus, there always exists a N.E. in pure strategies for this case.
L H
L
ρc
β
≤ f 1− β ≤ f ≤ ρc
1− β
H β ≤ f ≤ ρc
β
f ≤ β
Table 24: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH and ρc ≤ β <
1− β.
L H
L
ρc
f
≤ β < 1 1− f, 1− ρc
f
≤ β < 1
H 0 < β ≤ f, ρc
f
f ≤ β < 1
Table 25: Conditions for existence of N.E. when pbal ≤ pL < pH and ρc ≤ β ≤ 1− β
(b) β < ρc < 1− β
Table 26 gives the conditions for the existence of N.E. Note that (L, L) is never a N.E. Moreover,
at least one amongst (H, H), or (H, L) is always a N.E. Thus, a pure strategy N.E. always exists.
Recall that the ratio
ρc
f
represents the ratio of the revenue at high price to that at a low price.
Observe that for this case,
ρc
f
≥ 1 indeed corresponds to the condition for existence of N.E. at (H,
H).
(c) 1− β ≤ ρc
Table 27 gives the conditions for N.E. Note that (L, L) is never a N.E. and (L, H) is a N.E. iff (H,
L) is a N.E. Moreover, at least one amongst (H, H), or, (L, H) and (H, L) is always a N.E. Thus,
a pure strategy N.E. always exists.
2. β =
1
2
Table 28 gives the conditions for N.E. Observe that in this case, at least one pure strategy N.E. exists
for all values of 0 < f < 1. Further (L,H) is a N.E. iff (H,L) is a N.E.
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L H
L Never 1− β ≤ f ≤ ρc
1− β
H ρc ≤ f f ≤ ρc
Table 26: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH. and β < ρc <
1− β.
L H
L Never ρc ≤ f
H ρc ≤ f f ≤ ρc
Table 27: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH and β <
1− β ≤ ρc.
3. β >
1
2
.
Note that the platforms only differ in their customer loyalties (β and 1 − β). β < 1/2 corresponds to
a higher value of loyalty for Platform 2 whereas β > 1/2 corresponds to higher loyalty for Platform 1.
This case can be argued as done previously for the case β <
1
2
.
F Proof of Theorem 8
Lemma 5 Consider a general two-player simultaneous move game in two strategies with payoffs given by
Table 29. If the payoffs are such that the inequalities a22 < a12, b22 > b21, b11 > b12 and a11 < a21 are never
simultaneously satisfied. Additionally, if a22 > a12, b22 < b21, b11 < b12 and a11 > a21 cannot simultaneously
hold then there always exists a pure strategy N.E. for this game.
Proof:[Proof of Lemma 5] The conditions under which various pure strategy N.E. exist are listed in Table
30. We show the existence of at least one N.E. in all cases other than when a22 < a12, b22 > b21, b11 > b12
and a11 < a21 or a22 > a12, b22 < b21, b11 < b12 and a11 > a21. We break down our inspection for equilibria
into the following cases,
1. a22 ≥ a12, b22 ≥ b21, then (H, H) is a N.E.
2. a22 ≤ a12, b22 ≤ b21,
(a) a11 ≥ a21, b11 ≥ b12, then (L, L) is a N.E.
(b) a11 ≤ a21, b11 ≤ b12, then (L, H) and (H, L) are N.E.
(c) a11 ≥ a21, b11 ≤ b12, then (L, H) is a N.E.
(d) a11 ≤ a21, b11 ≥ b12, then (H, L) is a N.E.
3. a22 ≤ a12, b22 ≥ b21,
(a) a11 ≥ a21, b11 ≥ b12, then (L, L) is a N.E.
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L H
L 2ρc ≤ f 1
f
≤ min{2, 1
ρc
}, f ≤ 2ρc
H
1
f
≤ min{2, 1
ρc
}, f ≤ 2ρc 1
f
≥ min{2, 1
ρc
}
Table 28: Conditions for existence of N.E. for revenue competition game when pbal ≤ pL < pH and β = 1
2
.
L H
L (a11, b11) (a12, b12)
H (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
Table 29: Payoffs for a two player simultaneous move game.
(b) a11 ≤ a21, b11 ≤ b12, then (L, H) is a N.E.
(c) a11 ≥ a21, b11 ≤ b12, then (L, H) is a N.E.
(d) a11 ≤ a21, b11 ≥ b12, then it can be verified if any amongst a22 ≤ a12, b22 ≥ b21, a11 ≤ a21 or
b11 ≥ b12 admits an equality then a N.E. exists. The condition a22 < a12, b22 > b21, b11 > b12
and a11 < a21 in the lemma describes the condition under which none of the equations admit an
equality.
4. a22 ≥ a12, b22 ≤ b21 – This case can be argued as above.
Thus if the payoffs are such that a22 < a12, b22 > b21, b11 > b12 and a11 < a21 or a22 > a12, b22 < b21,
b11 < b12 and a11 > a21 never simultaneously hold, then there always exists a pure strategy N.E.
L H
L a11 ≥ a21, b11 ≥ b12 a22 ≤ a12, b11 ≤ b12
H a11 ≤ a21, b22 ≤ b21 a22 ≥ a12, b22 ≥ b21
Table 30: Conditions for existence of N.E. for game with payoffs in Table (29).
Proof:[of Theorem 8] We show that all of the following four inequalities cannot hold simultaneously,
1
f
< min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
,
1
ρβ
,
1
ρρw
} (115)
1
f
> min{ 1
β
,
1
ρc
,
1
ρ(1− β) ,
1
ρρw
}, (116)
f >
ρ
1− β , (117)
f <
ρ
β
. (118)
Combining (117) and (118), we get
β < 1− β. (119)
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Also, combining (117) with the fact that β ∈ (0, 1), we have
(1− β)ρ < ρ < ρ
1− β <f, (120)
(1− β)ρ <f. (121)
For (115) and (116) to simultaneously hold, atleast one of the following must be true,
1
β
<
1
f
< min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
,
1
ρβ
,
1
ρρw
}, (122)
1
ρ(1− β) <
1
f
< min{ 1
1− β ,
1
ρc
,
1
ρβ
,
1
ρρw
}. (123)
Observe that (122) cannot hold as it violates (119). Also, note that (123) cannot hold as it violates (121).
Thus, (115), (116), (117) and (118) cannot hold simultaneously. Arguing on similar lines, we can show that
(115) – (118) with β replaced by 1 − β cannot hold simultaneously as well. Thus, using Lemma 5, there
always exists a N.E. for this case.
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